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When the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the case of
Khlaiﬁa and Others v. Italy yesterday, many may have felt considerable disappointment. I for one did. What had
started as a next step in the development of the case-law on the prohibition of collective expulsion (Art. 4 Prot. 4
ECHR) in September 2015, has now taken a somewhat opposite turn.
The Grand Chamber judgment follows a judgment of the Second Section of the ECtHR which had caused some
heated debate, in particular regarding the Court’s ﬁnding that there had been a violation of Art. 4 of Protocol No.
4. The majority of Judges then stated that “a mere introduction of an identiﬁcation procedure is not suﬃcient in
itself to rule out the existence of a collective expulsion”. Furthermore, the fact that the Italian authorities did not
inquire about the speciﬁc situation of each applicant nor produce evidence of any individual interviews had
contributed to the Court’s assessment that the expulsion was of a collective nature. However, two markedly
dissenting opinions on this question were raised. As argued by the two dissenting Judges Sajó and Vucinic, the
Court’s deﬁnition of the concept of collective expulsion had been too wide and was as such not in line with the
reasoning in the four preceding cases in which the Court had found a violation of Art. 4 Protocol No. 4. In their
opinion, an expulsion collective in nature must either relate to a group of individuals who share some identity
characteristics, for instance ethnic origin or religion, or involve a group of individuals who had not been
individually identiﬁed by the competent authorities.
The Khlaiﬁa case concerns three Tunisian nationals who attempted to cross the Mediterranean Sea by boat,
were intercepted by the Italian coastguard and escorted to the Lampedusa shore in September 2011. In
accordance with a bilateral agreement concluded in early April 2011 – in response to the dramatically rising
numbers of persons ﬂeeing violence in the wake of the Arab Spring – the Italian authorities had applied a fast-
track procedure. The agreement which had never been made public allowed the Italian authorities to return
Tunisian nationals to Tunisia upon arrival in Italy after establishing their identity through the Tunisian consulate.
Aiming for the Italian coast, the three applicants had been intercepted by the Italian coastguard and taken to a
reception facility on the island of Lampedusa where they underwent a ﬁrst identiﬁcation procedure. As a
consequence of the large number of arrivals on the island, which had exceeded 50,000 by then, the three
applicants experienced overcrowding, a lack of privacy and inadequate hygienic conditions in the reception
centre. Furthermore, the applicants indicated that they were neither given the possibility to leave the facility nor
to contact a lawyer.
After the outbreak of a violent revolt and a demonstration – the applicants participated in the latter – the three
were ﬂown to Palermo where they embarked two vessels moored in the harbour. The three applicants were kept
on these vessels for some days and thereafter taken to the Tunisian consulate which re-conﬁrmed their
identities. Subsequently, all three were returned to Tunisia. Neither of them had applied for asylum with the
Italian authorities.
While the Grand Chamber found that there had been a violation of Art. 5 § 1 ECHR (the  right to liberty and
security), Art. 5 § 2 ECHR (right to be informed promptly of the reasons for deprivation of liberty) and Art. 5 § 4
ECHR (right to a speedy decision on the lawfulness of detention) as well as violation of Article 13 ECHR (right to
an eﬀective remedy) taken together with Art. 3 ECHR (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), it did not
follow the Chamber’s assessment in relation to violations of Art. 3 ECHR and Art. 4 Protocol No. 4 to the
Convention (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens). Both deviations entail notable implications for the
protection of the rights of migrants at Europe’s borders.
Had the Grand Chamber conﬁrmed the Chamber’s assessment, it would have been the ﬁfth time the Court has
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found a violation of the collective expulsion prohibition, after Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99 (2002), Hirsi Jamaa
and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09 (2012), Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255/07 (2014) and Shariﬁ and
Others v. Italy and Greece, no. 16643/09 (2014).
Instead, the Court ﬁrstly states that Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4 does not guarantee the right to an individual interview
in all circumstances but may be served “where each alien has a genuine and eﬀective possibility of submitting
arguments against his or her expulsion, and where those arguments are examined in an appropriate manner by
the authorities of the respondent State”. Secondly, it establishes that in this case the expulsion was not collective
in nature in spite of the simultaneous return of all three applicants, but merely a consequence of the issuance of
their individual refusal-of-entry-orders. Hence, the case facts fundamentally diﬀer from the situations in Čonka,
Hirsi Jamaa and Others, Georgia v. Russia (I) and Shariﬁ and Others.
However, Judge Serghides raises some strong arguments in his partly dissenting opinion how the Court might
have opened the ﬂood gates to decreasing the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention and its
Additional Protocol No. 4. In particular, he argues that the Court’s interpretation of the prohibition of collective
expulsion departs from previously established case-law. This had determined that Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4 was
aimed at preventing states from expelling aliens in a collective fashion without examining the individual
circumstances of each one through a personal interview. Judge Serghides further claims that “this interpretation
disregards the mandatory nature of the procedural obligation of the authorities to conduct personal interviews in
all cases engaging Article 4 of Protocol No. 4” meaning that the authorities were given a choice to determine
when to abstain from procedural obligations. Hence, the Convention’s safeguards were tied to the discretion of
the competent authorities at whom a complaint might be directed. This, in turn, would undermine the supervisory
role of the Court.
Chamber and Grand Chamber alike pointed out that they had taken into account the severity of the situation
caused by the large inﬂux of refugee in 2011 which had led Italy to declare a state of humanitarian emergency
for the island of Lampedusa. The Court took note of the lack of resources, accommodation and competent
oﬃcials to deal with the number of migrants. However, in view of these diﬃculties, diﬀerent conclusions were
reached.   
In that sense, what remains of the second Khlaiﬁa judgment is the disquieting feeling that the Court might have
actually neglected the opportunity to inhibit an easier, maybe even more non-transparent, conclusion and
implementation of readmission agreements at national and European level; instead of ensuring that the level of
protection enshrined in the Convention must not decrease in times of crises and during states of emergency. On
the other hand, conﬁrming its case-law on the right to liberty and security, the Court set out clear limits for the
detention of migrants and hence strengthened their rights with regard to the deprivation of liberty.
Unfortunately, the Court abstained from addressing the argument of the Italian government that the agreement
with Tunisia should be viewed analogue to a readmission agreement as provided for under the Return Directive.
An assessment of this aspect could have revealed further and more concrete implications for policy-making and
reform at the European level.
Nevertheless, the ruling is in fact an important compass for the after all pressing European crisis relating to
migration and asylum policy and thus bears strong implications for the reform and making of an eﬀective
Common European Asylum System compliant with international human rights standards. While a narrower
concept of collective expulsion may enable especially the EU member states at the borders of the Schengen
area to more eﬃciently and extensively protect their territory and prevent unlawful migrants from entering or
staying, it raises the risk of human rights violations through simpliﬁed expulsion measures. Hence, the Court also
had to take into account and balance the requirements of an eﬀective migration control vis-à-vis the states’
obligations under the ECHR.
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